For Iraqi IDPs, no choice but to return
In early January, Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) announced that it closed at least 47 IDP camps across the country over the past six months. The move is part of the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) plan, announced in late October 2020, to close all IDP camps by April 2021. While the challenges presented by COVID-19 have delayed the process, the GoI has remained determined to achieve the end goal. According to MoDM, the closure of the 47 camps, most of which are located in the liberated areas, has pushed some 66,000 IDP families to leave the camps.[i]
International and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have repeatedly raised concerns over the safe return of IDPs to their communities of origin. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) voiced its objections to the closure plan with the GoI, pointing out that Baghdad was closing camps without adequate notice to aid agencies and other stakeholders working in the camps.[ii] Additionally, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) warned that the closure of the IDP camps would render 100,000 individuals homeless.[iii]
The majority of returning families have re-settled in their areas of origin. However, a high but still undetermined number of IDPs decided to rent residences in urban areas in their respective governorates, which speaks to rising concerns over secondary displacement. Moreover, not all families have the means to rent property. Lack of basic services and infrastructure/destroyed properties, social tensions and opposition/concerns from host communities related to perceived Daesh affiliation of the returnees, absence of livelihood opportunities, the ongoing threat from Daesh remnants, and the presence of unexploded ordinance are among the significant factors preventing many IDPs from safely returning to their areas.
While the GoI claims that they were not forcibly returning IDPs, observers and civil rights activists believe that the decision to close the camps was a means to force the IDPs to return. Amid the multitude of challenges facing the GoI, including the pressing fiscal crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the drop in global oil prices, the current interim government may be keen for a symbolic achievement in the run up to the upcoming early elections, likely taking place in October this year. By closing the IDP camps across the country, PM al-Kadhimi could take the credit for ending the long-standing displacement crisis.
In an interview with ARK, a resident of Nineveh noted that there are no serious efforts by the GoI to help IDPs to willingly return to their areas of origin. “The government should encourage a voluntary return of IDPs by providing decent livelihoods and creating job opportunities for the returnees,” added the source.[iv]
ARK also spoke with a group of five returnees in Nineveh governorate, including women and a child, who recently left Hammam al-Alil 2 Camp in southern Mosul and currently reside in Mosul city. This group of returnees are among others who could not return to their areas of origin in western Ninawa for various reasons including poor infrastructure and lack of livelihood opportunities. The returnees refused to be named in this report due to personal/security concerns. They spoke about their current living conditions, concerns related to social tensions, and the limited support they have received from the government and the international community.
One of the male returnees said that they were surprised when the MoDM informed them that their shelter would be closed in 10 days. “We were unprepared,” he said, adding that “they [the MoDM] left us with no choice but to leave the camp.”
Another male returnee attributed the reason for staying in the camp over the past few years to lack of livelihood opportunities: “I was forced to return,” he said, adding that “I still cannot find a job opportunity where I currently live.”
Although the GoI seems to reveal a greater willingness than the previous government to address the drastic situation of IDPs in and outside the camps, there can be significant social cohesion challenges at the local community level to the successful reintegration of IDPs, particularly in those cases where stigmatisation/accusations of Daesh affiliation are present/prevalent. A recent report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on the challenges of IDP reintegration in Anbar provides an excellent window into the critical dynamics at community level which make reintegration of IDPs a particularly difficult and sensitive matter. According to the IOM report, “The return of IDPs with perceived affiliation cannot be deemed safe if it is not accepted by the community as a whole. There is risk of increasing secondary displacement if returns take place without the assent of the communities.”[v]
The reintegration of the so-called Daesh families appears to be particularly challenging given lack of acceptance by the communities. The majority of those families have little or no links to Daesh. They live in makeshift desert camps, with no schools, clinics and generally amidst very poor living conditions, in an arc stretching from Anbar to Nineveh. These families are predominantly local, most of them from rural areas in western and north-western Iraq, who fled their homes during the GoI-led military operations between 2016 and 2017 to recapture territories held by Daesh. However, there are also many Daesh families among the camp residents, but these remain mostly in a few specific camps such as the Jada-5 camp in southern Nineveh which continues to host IDPs as of the time of writing.
The returnees ARK spoke to said that they were concerned with the way the communities perceive them. “There is an obvious view of condescending and discrimination towards us from the local population,” one of the female returnees said. She also added that “people think we are either supporters of Daesh or have a criminal record. None of these are correct.”
The returnees also lamented the limited support they and their families have received in terms of psychological rehabilitation, training, and learning sessions from the government and/or the international community, during displacement and upon return.[vi]
The returning families have been displaced since 2014, when the conflict with Daesh started. According to data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), more than two million people were displaced from their areas during the conflict with Daesh in 2014. During the GoI-led operations to retake areas from Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in 2016 and 2017, an additional one million people were displaced due to the conflict activity.[vii]
Number of IDPs and returnees in Iraq since 2014 (source: IOM DTM)
The camp closure plans primarily targeted those located in the liberated areas including Nineveh, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala governorates. A number of camps were also closed in Baghdad and Kabala governorates. IDP and refugee camps in the Kurdistan region are unaffected by the decision. Nonetheless, the MoDM also stated that discussions over the closure of IDP camps in Kurdistan are underway.
On the vulnerabilities of returnees, a civil rights activist from Diyala said that the returning IDPs are the victims of the government’s decision. “Reintegrating IDPs into the society without prior rehabilitation programs leaves them at risk of extortion and threats, particularly those with an alleged Daesh stigma,” he said, adding that “their children will likely face a higher risk of being bullied at school.”[viii]
Meanwhile, a resident of Anbar explained to ARK how the return of the IDPs will have a negative impact on society and could contribute to the deterioration of the overall security situation in liberated areas. “Daesh militants could potentially exploit localized tensions to increase their footprint in the area,” he added.[ix]
While the MoDM stated it continues to pay emergency grants of some 1,000 USD to each family upon return, the returnees told ARK that they had not received any amount of cash from the government.[x]
Indeed, emergency grants are essential for the returning families as a short-term solution and could aid those who decided to rent residences to pay their rents until they completely resettle. Furthermore, increased responses by humanitarian actors are also needed; providing life-saving aid, protection, and legal assistance to the affected families could help returnees survive the winter and access governmental support. More importantly, a focus on social cohesion and reconciliation efforts and the provision of livelihood opportunities in areas witnessing return could serve as a long-term durable solution. This requires further coordination between the government, local community and tribal leaders, and humanitarian actors on the ground.
[i] “The MoDM: The closure of closing IDP camps in Kurdistan region is under discussion,” Rudaw, 19 January 2021 - https://bit.ly/2KAa2t8
[ii] ““UNHCR ramps up support to Iraqi returnees amid large-scale closure of IDP camps,” Relief Web, 13 November 2020 - https://bit.ly/2IUzUz7
[iii] “Iraq’s camp closures leave 100,000 people in limbo,” NRC, 9 November 2020 - https://bit.ly/3nPAwES
[iv] ARK source interview, 2 October 2020
[v] “Managing Return in Anbar: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with Perceived Affiliation,” International Organisation for Migration, 26 March 2020 - https://bit.ly/3ecwNO1
[vi] ARK interview with a recently returned IDP, 26 December 2020
[vii] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://bit.ly/3peE8S8
[viii] ARK source interview, 17 November 2020
[ix] Ibid
[x] “MoDM announces the 11th payment of grants to returning families,” Iraqi MoDM, 4 January 2021 - http://bit.ly/2JQLtaQ